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ABSTRACT
JOHN DAVID ROBERTSON: “Better the Firing Squad than the Mine Shaft”: The Rise 
and Fall of Militarized Labor Discipline in a Moravian Mining District, 1914-1916
(Under the direction of Chad Bryant)
This essay argues that a system of militarized labor discipline meant to mobilize 
the economic potential of the Habsburg state during wartime broke down in the Ostrava-
Karviná district in the spring of 1916, and that this breakdown was one facet of the 
failure of Habsburg attempts to construct a managerial state during the First World War. 
Labor mobilization was undermined by privation, and thus after 1916 militarized labor 
discipline began to reduce the state's capacity to mobilize labor. The increasing tension 
between unbearable wartime conditions and untenable military demands, in the Ostrava-
Karviná district as in the Monarchy as a whole, drove the population to act against the 
state.The mining population's alienation from the state as well as from the war effort also 
challenged the legitimacy of the state's power to direct and mobilize its citizenry, and thus 
influenced the Monarchy's collapse.
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I. Introduction
On a bitterly cold February day in 1916, the directors of the various mining 
companies operating in the Ostrava-Karviná coal district met in Moravská Ostrava, the 
region's administrative center. The mood was dour and the agenda grim. Food was 
running out. Austria-Hungary in general was facing a hunger crisis, and Ostrava-Karviná 
was not to be spared. The next harvest was far in the future. There was nothing else to do 
but to hope for external assistance. To that end, the directors of the coal district's various 
mining operations sent an appeal to the Imperial-Royal Ministry for Public Works with a 
simple message – without food, the miners could not and would not work. Their appeal 
concluded with the prophetic phrase “haste is in this question urgently necessary, as 
otherwise the course of events in the coal district will present us with a situation that we 
may no longer master.”1 The Ministry of Public Works ignored their appeal, and a series 
of strikes swept Ostrava-Karviná slightly over a month later. 
This essay will seek to demonstrate that the system of militarized labor discipline 
meant to mobilize the war-making potential of the Habsburg state broke down in the 
Ostrava-Karviná district in the spring of 1916, and that this breakdown was one facet of 
the failure of Habsburg attempts to construct a managerial state capable of mobilizing all 
of its resources for war. Initial success in labor mobilization was undermined by the 
experience of privation. The Ostrava-Karviná strike wave in March and April of 1916 
1.  Österreichische Staatsarchiv/Kriegsarchiv, Zentralstellen. Kriegsministerium 1916. Abteilung 5. 
(Hereafter ÖStA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5.) Carton 61, Nr. 46/6(47). "Direktoren-Konferenz des Ostrau-
Karwiner Steinkohlenrevieres." February 24th, 1916.
represented an inflection point at which militarized labor discipline began to reduce 
rather than increase the state's capacity to mobilize labor. Labor mobilization then 
transitioned from the original system of administrative coercion into piecemeal displays 
of open violence.
The Ostrava-Karviná district offers a unique window into the success and failure 
of Habsburg labor mobilization in the First World War, and can reveal much about the 
Habsburg war effort and its failures. The stresses which the coal district experienced in 
the First World War were particular to itself but also reflected larger trends. The district 
was a vital area for Habsburg industry and arms production, and an area long racked by 
sometimes violent labor unrest. A borderland both ethnically and geographically, Ostrava-
Karviná was exposed to Russian invasion and populated by Czech miners, Galician 
laborers, and German businessmen. Exposed to enemy invasion, populated largely by 
Slavic peoples, and vital to the war effort, the district's labor was more quickly and more 
thoroughly militarized than anywhere else in the Monarchy. Its industrial character and 
geographical seperation from agricultural supplies both heightened and accelerated the 
privation brought about by the First World War. The Czech and Polish working classes 
were also subject to the widespread anti-Slavic persecution launched and organized by 
the Habsburg military.
The system of militarized labor discipline imposed on the district at the beginning 
of the First World War was a legal regime under which labor service became equivalent, 
in the legal sense, with military service.  Motivated by the need to mobilize citizenry on 
behalf of the war effort and driven by the Habsburg military's grandiose conceptions of 
military necessity, this framework of militarized labor discipline relied on a regularized 
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system of administrative coercion characterized by legality enforced by military justice. 
The threat of violence conjoined with the promise of substinence generally sufficed to 
maintain labor discipline. This system was zealously enforced by a military establishment 
pre-disposed to radical solutions and contemptuous of the citizens of the Habsburg state. 
The 1916 strike wave brought the tension between privation and labor discipline to a 
head and demonstrated the difficulty of labor mobilization in the face of privation and the 
limits of coercion. Functionally loyal subjects, radicalized by suffering and deprivation, 
sought relief from the state. Railway cars immediately clattered into motion, filled not 
with food but instead with armed men tasked with restoring loyalty by force. The 
collision of the security of the individual and the security of the state became real not 
only for the soldier on the front lines but also for the laborer hewing coal. After the 1916 
strike wave, the miners of Ostrava-Karviná would mobilize themselves against the war 
effort instead of being mobilized by the state for it.
The increasing importance of Ostrava-Karviná's anthracite, and the increasing 
pressure to control the miners, can be found in the nature of total war. Following Roger 
Chickering, I understand total war to mean the “systematic erasure of distinctions 
between the military and civilian spheres...Civilians were as critical to the outcome...as 
were soldiers. Homefronts were essential to the material and moral support of armies, 
navies, and air forces.”2 Navigating the frequently conflicting and always complicated 
demands of maintaining both civilian morale and industrial productivity became equally 
as important as success in the field. The allied blockade, the overwhelming fact of the 
economic life of the Central Powers, forced the Monarchy to provide almost entirely for 
2.  Roger Chickering, The Great War and Urban Life in Germany: Freiburg, 1914-1918 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1.
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itself. It created a kind of involuntary autarky.3
The food crisis in the Habsburg Monarchy during the First World War has been 
well-covered.4 Coal shortages, though, have not been equally well treated. In this era, it 
was a truism that “[p]owerful nations...must possess powerful armaments, and coal is 
essential to the manufacture of armaments. Without coal the manufacture of iron and steel 
on a large scale is impracticable, and the by-products of coal distillation are necessary for 
the production of high explosives.”5 Coal's crucial role in the economy as the foundation 
of both war and civilian industrial production as well as transportation and heat gave it a 
much greater importance than any other commodity excepting foodstuffs.6 Unlike 
foodstuffs, though, coal required heavy investments in extractive technology and 
expertise restricted to a very limited geographical area. The Habsburg state sought to 
control coal as it sought to control food production, but the structural factors involved in 
coal mining gave the state much wider latitude in its efforts. Why and how it sought to do 
so, though, remains as of yet mostly unexplored.7
3.  Food, raw materials, and industrial products were occasionally available for purchase from Italy, 
Switzerland, or Romania, but never in sufficient quantities and less and less was available as the war went 
on, especially following Italy and Romania's entries into the war on the side of the Entente.
4.  Horst Haselsteiner's “The Habsburg Empire in World War I: Mobilization of Food Supplies,” in East 
Central European Society in World War I, ed. Béla Király and Nándor Dreisziger (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1985), Hans Loewenfeld-Russ' Die Regelung der Volksernährung im Kriege (Vienna, 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1926), and Hans Hautmann's “Hunger ist ein schlechter Koch. Die 
Ernährungslage der österreichischen Arbeiter im Ersten Weltkrieg” in Bewegung und Klasse: Studien zur 
österreichischen Arbeitergeschichte, ed. Gerhard Botz (Vienna, Munich, Zürich: Europaverlag, 1978), for 
example.
5.  R.W. Clarke, “The Influence of Fuel on International Politics,” Journal of the British Institute of  
International Affairs 2, no. 3 (1923): 109.
6.  Economic histories of the Habsburg Monarchy have recently tended to argue that the Habsburg 
economy was in fact stronger, more developed, and more efficient than previously thought, such as David 
Good, The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, 1750-1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1984). The only study on the Habsburg economy during the First World War argues that transportation 
inefficiencies and irrationalities were ultimately responsible for the Monarchy's economic collapse in 1918, 
though he does concede that coal limitations impacted the Habsburg economy. See Robert J. Wegs, Die 
Österreichische Kriegswirtschaft, 1914-1918, trans. Heinrich Mejzlik (Vienna: Verlag A. Schendl, 1979).
7.  A number of Czech historians have investigated labor movements, but they tended to focus on the 
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The Habsburg state's attempts to mobilize its population on behalf of the war 
effort has received some scholarly attention. Maureen Healy's study of wartime Vienna 
demonstrated that material deprivation in the form of endemic malnutrition played an 
important role in breaking down loyalty to the Habsburg state.8 Richard Plaschka, Horst 
Haselsteiner, and Arnold Suppan similarly argue that material deprivation and hunger led 
the Habsburg army to transition from a loyal to a revolutionary position in the last year of 
the Monarchy's existence, and that the loss of the military brought down the state.9 
Cristoph Führ has argued that the Habsburg Army High Command met some limited 
success in their efforts to use the wide powers to mobilize Habsburg society granted to it 
at the beginning of the First World War to implement a radical German nationalist and 
centralist agenda.10 Mark Cornwall argued that the Habsburg militarization of society 
during the First World War was responsible for delegitimating the war effort and 
preventing a secondary mobilization.11 
This secondary mobilization, launched or attempted by all of the belligerent states 
in the First World War, was a constellation of efforts aimed at rationalizing and 
political or revolutionary characteristics of the post-1916 period. See Dĕlnické hnutí na Ostravsku: sborník 
prací, ed. Andĕlin Grobelný and Bohumil Sobotík (Ostrava: Krajský národní výbor v Ostravě, 1957);  Josef 
Kolejka, Revoluční dělnické hnutí na Moravě a ve Slezsku 1917-1921 (Prague: Státní nakladatelství 
politické literatury, 1957); Milan Otáhal, Dělnické hnutí na Ostravsku 1917-1921: Příspĕvek k  
hospodářsko-sociálnímu a politickému vývoji ostravsko-karvínskeho revíru (Ostrava: Krajské nakladatelství 
v Ostravě, 1957).
8.  Maureen Healy, Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire: Total War and Everyday Life in World 
War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
9.  Richard. G. Plaschka, Horst Haselsteiner, and Arnold Suppan, Innere Front: Militärassistenz,  
Widerstand und Umsturz in der Donaumonarchie 1918, 2 vols (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1974).
10.  Christoph Führ, Das K.u.K. Armeeoberkommando und die Innenpolitik in Österreich, 1914-1917 
(Vienna: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1968).
11.  Mark Cornwall, "Morale and Patriotism in the Austro-Hungarian Army, 1914-1918," in State, Society  
and Mobilization in Europe during the First World War, ed. John Horne (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997).
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mobilizing economic production, manpower, and organization beyond the measures taken 
at the beginning of the war. It sought to place every resource of the state and its citizens 
at the service of the war effort.
What is lacking in this literature is an examination of how the interaction of 
material privation and the militarization of society influenced the Habsburg state's ability 
to mobilize its resources behind the war effort. The interplay of these two factors 
provides a much fuller explanation than either alone. As Isabel Hull and Vejas Liulevicius 
have demonstrated in the context of Imperial Germany, the institutions and practices of 
the military tend towards irrational and counterproductive applications of violence, 
whether in open battle or within a dynamic of occupation.12 These behaviors were not 
unique to the Wilhelmine Empire, and the interplay between military discipline and 
material privation in the Ostrava-Karviná district, as in the Monarchy as a whole, begs 
elucidation. Both factors played a part in the breakdown of the system of militarized 
labor discipline in the Ostrava-Karviná district.
Chapter One will address the geographic and demographic particulars of the 
Ostrava-Karviná district and the importance of the coal mining industry in Austria-
Hungary. Chapter Two will address the original mobilization of the coal district's labor 
force in its transition from peacetime labor relations to a system of militarized labor 
discipline at the beginning of the First World War. Chapter Three will investigate the 
origins and course of the strike wave of 1916, and the military response. The fourth and 
final chapter will address the debate among the civilian and military authorities.
12.  Isabel Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); Vejas Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture,  
National Identity, and German Occupation in World War I (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
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Figure 1. Areas under Military Administration in the Habsburg Monarchy. Source: Healy, Vienna 
and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire, 6.
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II. Of Lands and Peoples: Geography and Demography
In Austria-Hungary, as in other industrial states, coal deposits and their 
surrounding areas became crucial centers of industrial production and economic activity. 
Russian industry was, for example, heavily concentrated in the Dombrawa and Donetz 
basins, French industry in the coal basins of northern France, British industry in the 
Midlands, and German industry in the Ruhr, the Saar, and upper Silesia.13 Accidents of 
nature and geography situated the vast majority of Austria-Hungary's coal in Bohemia 
and Moravia. Minor quantities were  scattered throughout the remainder of the Austrian 
lands.14 Bohemia and Moravia accordingly became home to the most important industrial 
centers under Habsburg rule, especially in terms of heavy industry. The Škoda works in 
Plzeň and the Vítkovíce steel conglomerate in Ostrava were noteworthy in this regard.15
Austria-Hungary's coal deposits were much smaller than those of the other great 
powers. Only about three quarters of Austria's coal demands were met through domestic 
production in 1913, with the vast majority of the deficit covered through German 
imports.16 The types of coal available exacerbated this weakness, as the majority of 
Austrian coal was the considerably less valuable soft or 'brown' coal (lignite) rather than 
the much preferred hard or 'stone' coal (anthracite). Although Austrian lignite deposits 
13.  Clarke, “The Influence of Fuel," 110.
14.  Emil Homann-Herimberg, Die Kohlenversorgung in Österreich Während des Krieges (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1925). II-III.
15.  The Škoda works in Plzeň were fed by the Plzeň-Mies anthracite basin, while Vítkovíce was supplied 
from its shafts in the Ostrava-Karviná district.
16.  Wegs, Die österreichische Kriegswirtschaft, 21; Homann-Herimberg, Die Kohlenversorgung in 
Österreich, XXII.
were of a considerably higher grade than was typical in Europe, Austrian lignite was still 
less than half as energetic as anthracite, even though it constituted almost two thirds of 
yearly Austrian coal output.17 Anthracite was critical to steel production, and the Austrian 
iron and steel industry devoured virtually the entire domestic Austrian anthracite yield 
yearly.18
The most important anthracite field in Austria-Hungary was the Ostrava-Karviná 
basin. Divided between northeastern Moravia and Austrian Silesia, it was one of the 
richest in Europe.19 Centered around the municipality of Moravská Ostrava, the Ostrava-
Karviná basin encompassed thirty-nine mines with a yearly yield of over nine million 
tons of high-grade anthracite, a number of coking works with a yearly output of over two 
million tons of coke, and the Vítkovíce steel works, Austria-Hungary's most important 
steel producer.20 The coal mines employed 38,493 workers in 1913, with the coking 
plants employing an additional 4,490.21 The total population of the basin area was 
approximately one hundred and twenty thousand, including dependents, and as such over 
a third of the population was directly involved in coal production.22 Miners and their 
families were not, as a rule, allowed any sort of garden plot, though approximately a fifth 
17.  Wegs, Die österreichische Kriegswirtschaft, 16; Homann-Herimberg, Die Kohlenversorgung in 
Österreich, I. 27,461 tons of lignite in 1913 vs 16,336 tons of anthracite.
18.  Homann-Herimberg, Die Kohlenversorgung in Österreich, II; Richard Riedl, Die Industrie Österreichs  
Während des Krieges (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932). 275.
19.  Norman J. G. Pounds, “The Spread of Mining in the Coal Basin of Upper Silesia and Northern 
Moravia,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 48, no. 2 (1958): 149. The Ostrava-Karviná 
district was located over the same coal field as the German industrial conurbation of Upper Silesia.
20.  Homann-Herimberg, Die Kohlenversorgung in Österreich, 1. Production numbers referenced are from 
1913 figures.
21.  Homann-Herimberg, Die Kohlenversorgung in Österreich, XXX.
22.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 61, Nr. 46/6(5). "Bericht." Jaroslav Petr, April 6th, 1916. 
117,000 people in 1916.
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of the steel workers at the nearby Vítkovice Iron Works were so-called "iron peasants" 
who supplemented their factory labor with agricultural production.23
The First World War only increased the importance of the Ostrava-Karviná basin. 
The Austrian Minister of the Interior had urged stockpiling coal supplies as a precaution 
before the outbreak of the war, but nothing of significance had been done before August 
rendered the question moot.24 The outbreak of the war and the imposition of a near-total 
allied blockade against the Central Powers cut off most external coal supplies, but coal 
imports from outside of the Central Powers bloc were virtually non-existent before the 
war, and the disappearance of the small quantities of imported British coal shipped 
through Trieste had little impact. German anthracite exports to Austria fell drastically, and 
alternative sources of foreign supply capable of compensating for the drop in German 
exports were not available.25 
At the beginning of the war the Silesian half of the district was placed under 
military law as part of the Zone of Army Operations on the Russian front, and large 
numbers of workers crucial to coal production took up rifles and rucksacks and went off 
to fight the foes of the Habsburgs.  The War Ministry, though, was cognizant of the 
centrality of the Ostrava-Karviná area to the Monarchy's coal production and had thus 
arranged that in the district those men liable to militia service but not liable to 
23.  Peter Huemos, "'Kartoffeln her oder es gibt eine Revolution': Hungerkrawalle, Streiks und 
Massenproteste in den böhmischen Ländern 1914-1918," in Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Beziehungen 
zwischen Tschechen, Slowaken und Deutschen, ed. Hans Mommsen, Dušan Kovíč, and Jiří Malíř (Essen: 
Klartext, 2001).
24.  Wegs, Die österreichische Kriegswirtschaft, 81.
25.  Homann-Herimberg, Die Kohlenversorgung in Österreich, XXII. German anthracite exports to Austria 
dropped from 10,351,000 tons in 1913 to 7,896,000 tons in 1914 and 7,449,000 tons in 1915, a drop of 
almost 25%.
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conscription were not inducted into the army.26 Even after such arrangements, the 
Ostrava-Karviná coal basin sent approximately a quarter (24.6%) of its mining population 
into the army during the initial mobilization.27 Despite attempts to broaden the labor pool 
through use of female and POW labor, available labor was never again to reach 1913 
levels.28 Increased working hours and Sunday and holiday labor, however, led to 
significant increases in per-worker coal output. By 1915 coal production in the Ostrava-
Karviná basin actually surpassed 1913 production figures, though anthracite production 
in Austria as a whole remained slightly below 1913 figures until 1916. This increase 
came entirely through longer shifts and the elimination of free days.29
Demographically, the Ostrava-Karviná basin was composed of roughly equal 
proportions of Czechs and Poles, the vast majority of whom were immigrants. The Polish 
population stemmed chiefly from Galicia, and the Czech population was drawn from all 
over Moravia and eastern Bohemia.30 According to a local police councillor's report filed 
in late 1914, those Germans who lived in the coal district were mostly engaged in 
management and other white collar occupations, but their numbers were few and their 
political activity was negligible. Their allegiance was primarily to the Liberals 
(predominantly the Jewish population) or to German nationalist parties. The working 
26.  Die Regelung der ArbeitsVerhältnisse im Kriege, ed. Ferdinand Hanusch and Emanuel Adler (Vienna: 
Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky). 177.
27.  Wegs, Die österreichische Kriegswirtschaft, 84.
28.  Homann-Herimberg, Die Kohlenversorgung in Österreich, XXX. POW labor never amounted to much 
in any case – the most urgent need was for trained mining personnel, very few of whom were among 
Habsburg prisoners of war. Only approximately 500 POWs were employed in the Ostrava-Karviná district 
in 1915 and less than half that number in 1916 and 1917. See Die Regelung der Arbeitsverhältnisse, 221.
29.  Ibid., II, XXXI. Workers in the Ostrava-Karviná district produced 2458 cubic meters pro capita a year 
in 1913, 2781 in 1914, and 2934 in 1915. The Ostrava-Karviná district produced in total 9,388,363 tons in 
1913, 8,917,922 tons in 1914, and 9,572,771 tons in 1915.
30.  Regelung der Arbeitsverhältnisse, 186.
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classes were primarily social democratic, although Czechs and Poles were split along 
national lines.31 
The Czech social democratic movement in the coal district was riven by a bitter 
feud between centralists advocating an internationalist vision of social democracy and 
autonomists emphasizing a Czech nationalist approach.32 Those Czechs outside of the 
Social Democratic faction were further divided into 'Old Czech', clerical, and progressive 
(pokrokáři) factions.33 Of these, only the radical wing of the progressives advocated 
russophilism or serbophilism. The Czech social democrats were capable of putting 
together street demonstrations of respectable size, but nationalist parties and groups were 
seldom seen and quite weak.34
Since Ostrava-Karviná was the most important coal basin in the Monarchy, both 
Vienna and the Army High Command (AOK) in Teschen paid close attention to 
developments there. The importance of the anthracite supply for transport and industry, 
Hungary's demands for coal to fuel her industries and heat her cities in exchange for the 
flour needed to feed the Monarchy's armies,35 and the necessity of supplying urban areas 
with heat all combined to make any disturbance in Ostrava-Karviná's coal output a 
31.  Státní Ústřední Archiv v Praze, Sborník dokumentů k vnitřnímu vývoji v českých zemích za 1. Světové 
Války, 1914-1918. Svazek I. - Rok 1914 (Prague: Státní Ústřední Archiv v Praze, 1993). 137-138. Police 
Councillor's Report, November 3rd, 1914.
32.  Ibid.
33.  For further explanation of these factions and parties, see H. Louis Rees, The Czechs During World War 
I: The Path to Independence (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992). 1-21.
34.  Státní Ústřední Archiv v Praze, Sborník dokumentů. 1:137-138. Police Councillor's Report, November 
3rd, 1914.
35.  The Ministry of Public Works negotiated a deal with the Hungarian government to deliver anthracite 
and coke suitable for industrial uses in exchange for Hungarian foodstuffs for the army. In some instances, 
coal was also traded for food for the civilian population. See Haselsteiner, “The Habsburg Empire in World 
War I,” 93-96; Regelung der Arbeitsverhältnisse, 216; ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 61, Nr. 
46/6(47). "Direktoren-Konferenz des Ostrau-Karwiner Steinkohlenrevieres." February 24th, 1916; Homann-
Herimberg, Die Kohlenversorgung in Österreich, 7.
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pressing threat to the stability and security of the Monarchy as a whole.36 Both the 
Ostrava-Karviná district's pre-eminence in anthracite production and its high-capacity rail 
connection with Vienna and Austria's main transportation networks made it the optimal 
region for supplying anthracite to cover all of these needs.37
36.  Homann-Herimberg, Die Kohlenversorgung in Österreich, 7; Wegs, Die österreichische 
Kriegswirtschaft, 82. As an example, Ostrava-Karviná supplied 33,800 tons of coal to Vienna during the 
winter of 1914-1915.
37.  Miroslav Havrlant and others, Dĕjiny Ostravy: Vydáno k 700. Výročí založení mĕsta (Nakladatelství 
Profil: Ostrava, 1967). 735; The Ministry for Transport and Traffic, “Traffic and Transport in Austria,” 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 1921, no. 98:40-41. The rail link with 
Vienna, established in 1847, was also instrumental in the growth of the Vítkovíce works.
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Table 1. Anthracite Production in the Ostrava-Karviná District. Source: Homann-Herimberg, Die 
Kohlenversorgung in Österreich, V.
Production, in Tons of Anthracite
Months 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918
January 808773 848146 745161 875980 899466 764293
February 754436 771671 712350 878356 791530 665846
March 720225 833052 845248 950892 944808 859870
April 836631 754916 762835 840390 801913 816493
May 748384 776979 804376 952865 822451 718469
June 789699 749644 772844 884075 880663 747052
July 826836 793871 820697 919896 721706 775213
August 786719 577158 820081 950463 963812 781602
September 773848 671143 819427 913772 936520 640075
October 802813 731271 839165 933449 953713 ----
November 794063 699258 814763 911515 894273 ----
December 745936 710813 815824 885817 809651 ----
Total 9388363 8917922 9572771 10897470 10420506 ----
Table 2. Austro-Hungarian Anthracite Production. Source: Homann-Herimberg, Die 
Kohlenversorgung in Österreich, X.
Production, in Tons of Anthracite
Months 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918
January 1430398 1464874 1264749 1450717 1474540 1281343
February 1308499 1331567 1251869 1438717 1310428 1137539
March 1278476 1451724 1443517 1537849 1532542 1392415
April 1414103 1306039 1277671 1370999 1292225 1297866
May 1299779 1339675 1317533 1532215 1315223 1097559
June 1355531 1307177 1274989 1426133 1388327 1181227
July 1438087 1378581 1367140 1490572 1254637 1201783
August 1364655 978618 1374401 1521827 1487750 1192694
September 1344722 1142289 1360107 1470414 1443171 1012889
October 1400868 1272848 1403476 1460197 1510599 ----
November 1384373 1196421 1370482 1459404 1423065 ----
December 1317113 1241558 1377143 1442667 1323022 ----
Total 16336604 15411371 16083077 17601711 16755529 ----
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III. Severe Unrest: Ostrava-Karviná and Austro-Hungarian Mobilization
In Austria-Hungary, as in the other belligerent states, mobilization was a festival 
of cheering crowds and patriotic speeches. An outflow of patriotic feeling accompanied 
the thrill of change; war held out the promise of regeneration. This did not mean 
everyone was overjoyed to go off to war, but mobilization was carried through 
surprisingly successfully.38 Several accounts held that the beginning of the war heralded a 
kind of Bürgfrieden in the Ostrava-Karviná district – a police councillor reported that 
Germans and Slavs “collectively poured out into the streets and broke out into patriotic 
songs. Terrified, the subversive elements shrunk away.”39
All of the extant political and national groupings, even the Czechs, showed 
themselves to be loyal subjects of the Habsburg crown, though the Czechs in particular 
were not infected with a great deal of war enthusiasm, the report continued. Russophile 
elements in the coal district, though, “can not be dismissed. The majority thereof are the 
radical Czechs...in relation to the remaining population they are a tiny majority”.40 A 
perhaps less optimistic though probably more accurate account characterized the 
beginning of the war as putting nationality conflicts on hold, though antagonisms 
continued to bubble under the surface.41 Unfortunately, lack of evidence impedes a 
38.  István Deák, Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps,  
1848-1918 (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) 190-191.
39.  Státní Ústřední Archiv v Praze, Sborník dokumentů 1:137-138. Police Councillor's Report, November 
3rd, 1914.
40.  Ibid., 139-140.
41.  Regelung der Arbeitsverhältnisse, 202-203.
definitive conclusion, but available accounts suggest that at least the early stages of the 
war were mostly devoid of explicitly nationalist conflicts.
Czech units throughout the Bohemian Lands also mobilized just as faithfully as 
all other Austro-Hungarian units, despite wide-spread fears of disloyalty and 
russophilism. Scattered minor incidents did occur, such as when a Militia conscript in 
Prague, one Otokar Luštinec by name, answered his ethnic German comrades' 'Long live 
Austria!' with his own 'Long live Serbia, and may Austria perish!'. He was promply 
beaten and handed over to the police.42 Such events were neither widespread nor 
important, but governmental and military officials continued to worry that the Czech 
population would hinder mobilization.43 
Important elements of the German Right continued to harbor paranoid fears of 
Slav disloyalty even after the successful mobilization. Such fears, and the consequent 
calls for the imposition of “that iron fist, which is so potent a guard for those interests that 
govern in Transleithania,” would play a significant role in driving the Slavic peoples of 
the Monarchy away from their allegiance to the Habsburgs.44 Habsburg military 
authorities routinely accused the Czechs in particular of treason and cowardice, both at 
home and at the front.45
42.  Státní Ústřední Archiv v Praze, Sborník dokumentů. 1:31-32. The incident occurred in the railway 
station Kukus, on the 27th of July, 1914.
43.  For instance, see Statthalter Franz Thun's declarations of the 25th and 26th of July, 1914, in Ibid., 23-27.
44.  Conrad to Hohenlohe, Dec. 12th, 1915. KA -Tb. Kundmann, 12.12. 1915. Reprinted in: Führ, 
Armeeoberkommando, 170. For more in-depth treatments of German radicalism and slavophobia in 
Cisleithania, see Gary W. Shanafelt, The Secret Enemy: Austria-Hungary and the German Alliance, 1914-
1918 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); Robert A. Kann, The Multi-National Empire:  
Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1950).
45.  Jan Havránek, "Politische Repression und Versorgungsengpässe in den böhmischen Ländern 1914 bis 
1918," in Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Beziehungen zwischen Tschechen, Slowaken und Deutschen, ed. 
Hans Mommsen, Dušan Kovíč, and Jiří Malíř (Essen: Klartext, 2001).
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The Imperial and Royal government regarded Social Democracy as a potent threat 
to the war effort as well, taking Marxist rhetoric of class solidarity and internationalism 
seriously. The left wings of the ethnically divided Austrian Social Democratic parties did 
contain members who urged a general strike against the war in solidarity with the 
European working class.46 In all the major parties, though, the leadership announced itself 
loyal to Emperor and Fatherland and supported the war effort with all their power.47 The 
German Social Democratic party leadership, for example, exhorted their followers to 
“show that the men of the class struggle will also give their last breath in service to the 
flag!”48 Indeed, by 1917 social democratic political organizations had become fully 
integrated into the state and formed an indispensable prop to its authority.49
Industrial mobilization for war throughout the Monarchy had pre-occupied 
political and military authorities in the Habsburg Monarchy since 1908.50 The Balkan 
Wars impelled a desire to rebuild Habsburg military strength and increase its capacity to 
assert itself on the international stage.51 The Reichsrat thus passed a series of laws that 
constructed a new framework for labor mobilization during a time of war. The most 
important of these, the War Production Law (Kriegsleistungsgesetz) of the 26th of 
46.  Austro-Hungarian Social Democracy was split between German, Czech, Yugoslav, Italian, and Polish 
parties. See Hermann J.W. Kuprian, “On the Threshold of the Twentieth Century: State and Society in 
Austria before World War I,” in Austria in the Twentieth Century, ed. Rolf Steininger, Günter Bischof and 
Michael Gehler (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002). 23.
47.  See for example the Vienna Police Directorate's report of Nov. 8th, 1914 on the position of the German 
party leadership in Vienna. AVA MdI 22i.g.16282, reprinted in: Rudolf Neck, Arbeiterschaft und Staat im 
Ersten Weltkrieg 1914-1918 (Vienna, Europa-Verlag, 1964). 8-11.
48.  Die Regelung der Arbeitsverhältnisse, 3.
49.  Hautmann, “Hunger ist ein schlechter Koch,” 677.
50.  Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999 (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2001). 290-291.
51.  "Der Ausbruch des allgemeinen Balkankrieges", Die Neue Freie Presse, October 14th, 1912, 
Nachmittagblatt.
17
December, 1912, gave the state the right to essentially nationalize any industrial or 
commercial operation deemed important for war production. This process converted the 
workers employed by the nationalized concerns into militia laborers subject to military 
discipline and military courts. These workers were no longer employed by capital in a 
free labor market, but were instead in a state of involuntary servitude, subordinated 
directly to the military. Disobedience became treason, changing jobs became desertion, 
and striking became mutiny.52 In exchange, though, the state offered guaruntees to 
support the workers militarized under the War Production Law and their dependents. 
Articles 8 and 34 of the War Production Law guarunteed the same rights to state support 
to War Production Law workers as were given to those of active-duty soldiers, paid out of 
the military budget and guarunteed by state funds.53 This grand bargain, intended to 
discipline unruly workers and mobilize their labor for the war effort, would be imposed 
on the Ostrava-Karviná district upon the outbreak of the First World War.
While organized labor and its political arm failed to give the state any trouble, and 
indeed declared itself a strong supporter of the central government, the same could not be 
said of all workers. A recent regulation issued by mine management in the Ostrava-
Karviná district had imposed payroll deductions on the entire mining workforce in the 
coal district for the purpose of renovating an infirmary, ostensibly for the benefit of the 
workers.54 The workers themselves, however, would vigorously oppose the measure, 
continuing their long history of labor unrest and strike movements.
52.  Reichsgesetzblatt für die im Reichsrath vertretenen Königreiche und Länder (Vienna: Kaiserl.-königl. 
Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1912). XCIX. Stück, Nr. 236. 1192.
53.  Ibid.
54.  “Drohender Bergarbeiterstreik,” Die Neue Freie Presse, July 24th, 1914, Morgenblatt. 
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On the 22nd of July, the Reichspost's Troppau correspondent reported that mob 
violence had broken out, and the crowds of “youths and unsavory elements ...committed 
various excesses and crimes against property”.55 When the mob threatened to storm the 
mine shafts, the district police managed to hold them off, but by later that evening the 
crowd had swelled to over a thousand people.56 The mob sought to march on Vítkovíce, 
site of the most important steelworks in the Monarchy, but the reinforced district police 
force proved sufficient, if barely, to the task of holding them off. Arrests made in the 
course of attempting to disperse the mob, though, led to multiple attempts to storm the 
police barracks and free those imprisoned. A hail of stones from the mob was answered 
by repeated bayonet charges, in which, surprisingly, only two people were injured. An 
unknown assailant fired several shots at the police and was answered in kind, but the 
bullets failed to meet their targets.57
Upon receipt of the news, the County Presidium in Troppau immediately 
requested that two battalions of infantry from the garrison at Olomouc be dispatched to 
the coal district in order to reinforce the police.58 Troppau issued a further request to 
Military Command Cracow to send sufficient force to maintain public order, though those 
forces were not to arrive until the following day.59 On the next day, the 23rd, over five 
55.  “Große Ausschreitungen im Mährisch-Ostrauer Kohlenrevier,” Prager Tagblatt, July 23rd, 1914, 
Morgenblatt.
56.  “Die Deutschfeindlichen Exzesse in Witkowitz und Ostrau,” Die Neue Freie Presse, July 24th, 1914, 
Morgenblatt. The Neue Freie Presse sought to characterize the mob violence as motivated primarily by 
ethnic antagonism, and the violence primarily directed against Germans and German property. The article, 
though, closely follows Pieter Judson's template for nationality conflict reports, which, as he has 
compellingly demonstrated, were somewhat less than impartial and objective. There is even a German 
schoolhouse besieged. See Pieter M. Judson, Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers 
of Imperial Austria (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006). 19-66.
57.  “Große Ausschreitungen,” July 23rd, 1914.
58.  “Militärverstärkung nach Mährisch-Ostrau,” Prager Tagblatt, July 24th, 1914, Morgenblatt. 
59.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1914, Abt. 5. Carton 1, Nr. 3/5. "Telegramm." July 23rd, 1914.
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thousand miners spread over seven mines went on strike, around fifteen percent of the 
district's workforce. The unrest was such that a general strike involving the entirety of the 
coal district was a serious possibilty.60 Management stemmed the expansion of the unrest 
into the Vítkovíce workforce by decreeing that “any worker taking part in demonstrations 
of any kind may expect immediate termination,” but mine management in the coal district 
shied away from similar measures.61 Whether this was out of fear or inability is uncertain.
The strike, and the threatening possibility of its expansion, went beyond the 
ability of the local authorities to handle. The Prager Tagblatt reported that that the 
“police and gendarmerie were no longer capable of maintaining order”.62 Thankfully for 
the authorities, that evening the Extraordinary Security Force (Assistenz) sent from 
Cracow arrived. Military Command Cracow had dispatched nine companies of infantry, 
two machine gun detachments, and two squadrons of cavalry from the Imperial and 
Royal 1st Corps, under the command of Major-General von Zaleski.63 This was a force of 
approximately two thousand infantrymen, six hundred cavalry troopers, and four machine 
guns.64 These men were met by a “throng of many thousands, which greeted the military 
with derisive taunts”.65
The next day, the War Minister ordered von Zaleski's detachment to stand ready to 
60.  “Drohender Bergarbeiterstreik,” July 24th, 1914.
61.  “Die Deutschfeindlichen Exzesse,” July 24th, 1914.
62.  “Militärverstärkung nach Mährisch-Ostrau,” July 24th, 1914.
63.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1914, Abt. 5. Carton 1, Nr. 3/5. "Telegramm." July 23rd, 1914. Cracow estimated that 
more men were needed, but the harvest represented an obstacle to immediate deployment of more 
manpower, as much of the Austro-Hungarian Army's manpower was released on 'Harvest Leave' during the 
harvesting season in order to facilitate crop gathering. 
64.  For troop strengths of various formations, see Deák, Beyond Nationalism. 15.
65.  “Verstärkung des Militärs in Mährisch-Ostrau,” Die Neue Freie Presse, July 23rd, 1914, Morgenblatt.
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enforce a State of Emergency in the industrial region centered on Moravská Ostrava.66 
The Chief of the Imperial and Royal General Staff, Conrad von Hötzendorf, was, 
however, not consulted. Informed, he wrote, through reading his morning newspaper, that 
elements of the 1st Corps were being used to suppress labor unrest, he demanded the 
substitution of a detachment from the 2nd Corps, as the 1st Corps were to be trusted with 
an important role in case of war with Russia.67 More likely, though, was that the 
predominantly Polish men of the Cracow-based 1st Corps were considered less effective 
in suppressing their co-nationals than the German soldiers of the 2nd Corps, recruited 
from Vienna and Upper and Lower Austria. The highest levels of the Austrian 
governmental and military establishments, then, deemed it vitally necessary that there be 
sufficient armed force available in Ostrava-Karviná to ensure public order.
The spiraling crisis with Serbia cast its shadow over the Ostrava-Karviná basin as 
well, and in this light the labor unrest took on a new and even more threatening aspect. 
The Ministry of Home Defense and the Ministry of the Interior, in a dispatch to the 
Imperial and Royal War Ministry in Vienna, expressed their conviction that even a partial 
mobilization order would meet widespread resistance and enforcement thereof would 
require not only the full strength of the local police forces, already stretched to their limit 
and beyond by the escalating civil and labor unrest, but also the immediate deployment of 
all available military personnel. The military was further to be deployed at the latest by 
Sunday, July 26th, if the unrest was not yet under control.68 The War Ministry took their 
fears seriously, and ordered the immediate deployment of von Zaleski's troops on the 25th 
66.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1914, Abt. 5. Carton 1, Nr. 3/5(5256). "Assistenzbeistellung." July 23rd, 1914.
67.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1914, Abt. 5. Carton 1, Nr. 3/5(6214). "Unruhen in Witkowitz; Ablösung der 
Truppen des 1. Kps." July 24th, 1914.
68.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1914, Abt. 5. Carton 1, Nr. 3/5(Präs. 4262-XX). "Abschrift." July 24th, 1914.
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of July – three days before the declaration of war on Serbia began the First World War.69 
The military's show of force sufficed to quell the unrest, as the Ministry of the Interior 
reported that the riots and strikes were “already ebbing away.”70 
The course of events in this strike were representative of the pattern that labor 
unrest took in the Ostrava-Karviná district before the First World War. Strikes were 
typically numerically strong and tended towards violence, usually directed against 
property. Clashes with police and the military occasionally resulted in deaths. Some were 
quite long – one strike in the summer of 1896 lasted an entire month. These strikes, like 
the 1914 strike, were driven by economic demands directed against those capital interests 
which employed the miners rather than against the state.71 The local authorities called 
upon the Habsburg military to maintain order but resolving the strike or compelling the 
miners to work was not in the military's purview. Their writ ran solely to the maintenance 
of public order.72 The First World War and the imposition of militarized labor discipline in 
the district, though, was to drastically alter this pattern of labor unrest.
The Austro-Hungarian government had demonstrated both the willingness and the 
ability to exert large-scale military force against civil and labor unrest in the interests of 
securing public order and assuring the area's compliance even at the very beginning of the 
First World War. The prompt application of military force ensured that mobilization 
unfurled as planned, though it may have been as unnecessary in Ostrava-Karviná as it 
69.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1914, Abt. 5. Carton 1, Nr. 3/5. "Einziehung beigestellter Assistenzen im 
Industriegebiete Mähr. Ostrau." July 25th, 1914.
70.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1914, Abt. 5. Carton 1, Nr. 3/5. "Bericht." Abt. 10, July 25th, 1914.
71.  Růžena Vyhnalíková, “Generální stávka horníků na Ostravsku-Karvínsku roku 1900” in Dĕlnické hnutí  
na Ostravsku: sborník prací, ed. Andĕlin Grobelný and Bohumil Sobotík (Ostrava: Krajský národní výbor 
v Ostravě, 1957), 78-81.
72.  Dienstreglement für das kaiserliche und königliche Heer. Erster Teil. (Vienna: Druck und Verlag der 
kaiserl.-königl. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1909), 232-233.
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was unnecessary in most other areas of the Bohemian lands. As the First World War 
began, the government would immediately move to exert an even more ambitious level of 
military control over the miners of the Ostrava-Karviná basin. This regime would rely on 
military discipline and administrative coercion rather than the direct application of 
violence.
The concluding report on the strike offered the Ministry's view that “the already-
prepared extraordinary measures, to come into effect on declaration of mobilization and 
under which civilians shall be placed under military justice, ought suffice to ensure peace 
and order even after the departure of the troops.”73 The extraordinary measures referenced 
were a novel and wide-ranging subordination of the Habsburg subject to the disciplinary 
power of the state. Aimed at ensuring internal security, order, and productivity in war-
time, these measures were not limited solely to the miners of the Ostrava-Karviná basin. 
The largely trouble-free period lasting from the outbreak of the First World War until 
1916 would demonstrate, though, that such measures were to prove quite effective at 
harnessing Ostrava-Karviná's labor to the needs of the state.
This process of subordination and discipline began on the 25th of July, as General 
Zaleski was crushing the miner strikes in Ostrava-Karviná. Based on the powers granted 
to the government under §20 of the Constitution, the cabinet suspended articles 8, 9, 10, 
12, and 13 of the Constitution and activated articles 3-7 of the 'Emergency Law' of the 5th 
of May, 1869.74 In practice, this meant that Austrian civilians partially or totally lost their 
rights to personal freedom, security of the home, privacy of their letters, freedom of 
73.  Ibid.
74.  Reichs-Gesetzblatt für das Kaiserthum Österreich (Vienna: Kaiserl.-königl. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 
1869). XXXI. Stück, Nr. 66. 304.
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association, freedom of expression, and freedom of the press, as well as their right to a 
jury trial.75 The same day also saw an Imperial Decree subordinating civilians to military 
justice for a wide range of crimes and misdemeanors in “territorial regions in which 
mobilization has been declared,” which in practice meant the entirety of Austria. The 
crimes transferred ranged from high treason and lese majesté to robbery, assault, murder, 
sabotage, interference with public officials, disturbing the peace, and rioting.76 
The mining population, though, was under even stricter control than the general 
population. Immediately upon the outbreak of war, the entire coal district was militarized 
under the War Production Law.77 The employees of the various mining companies 
operating in the coal district, all of which had been declared war production facilities, 
were under article six of the law "obligated to remain in their current service or labor 
position until the situation of application ceases to apply".78 Functionally, this meant that 
every single miner in the coal district was under a legal obligation to remain at his 
position until the end of the war. 
The majority of coal miners in the Ostrava-Karviná district faced a slightly 
different type of militarization than the War Production Law, however. According to the 
Militia Law of the 6th of June, 1886, all males between the ages of nineteen and forty-
three were liable to service in the militia in a time of war.79 A further decree of the 20th of 
December, 1889, elaborated on this language, expressly allowing the use of militia 
75.  Führ, Armeeoberkommando, 18-19.
76.  Reichsgesetzblatt (1914).  LXXI. Stück, Nr. 156. 821.
77.  Havrlant, Dĕjiny Ostravy, 401.
78.  Reichsgesetzblatt (1912). XCIX. Stück, Nr. 236. 1192.
79.  Reichsgesetzblatt (1886). XXXI. Stück, Nr. 90. 297-299.
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conscripts in civilian industrial positions.80 Article 19 of the Ministry for Home Defense 
Decree of the 27th of July, 1912, further allowed the use of mobilized militia laborers in 
all stages of arms production.81  Such labor, though, had to be producing for the war 
effort. In situations wherein a group of War Production Law or militia laborers were 
assigned a military commander, disobeying him was considered equivalent to an enlisted 
man refusing orders in a war zone.82 Needless to say, every shift of mine laborers 
received their own military commander at the beginning of the war.83
The position of an Ostravan coal miner after the beginning of the First World War, 
then, was one of helpless subordination to the state, enforced by a legal regime which 
equated mine labor with military service and correspondingly equated protest or 
resistance to any measures aimed at increasing or rationalizing production to high 
treason.84 Those workers younger than nineteen or older than forty-three and thus not 
liable to militia service were nonetheless subject to the War Production Law. Strikes were 
expressly forbidden, and labor unrest was punishable by imprisonment, being transferred 
to front-line service, or even in extreme cases execution for treason.85 The costs 
associated with defying the militarized regime under which the miners were forced to 
serve were very high. That it took years of suffering before resistance began to surface is 
not surprising. What is surprising was that it surfaced at all.
80.  Die Regelung der Arbeitsverhältnisse, 40-41.
81.  Reichsgesetzblatt (1912). LXIV. Stück, Nr. 153.708.
82.  Die Regelung der Arbeitsverhältnisse, 43.
83.  Havrlant, Dĕjiny Ostravy, 401.
84.  Die Regelung der Arbeitsverhältnisse, 5.
85.  Ibid., 189.
25
IV. Calamitous Methods of Compulsion: The Ostrava-Karviná Strike Wave of 1916
By the beginning of 1916, coal shortages were becoming dire. Demand for 
anthracite for Austrian iron and steel production alone had increased by almost four 
million tons over the 1914 figure, and one of the coldest winters on record spiked demand 
for heating coal throughout the Monarchy.86 Despite reduced effectiveness, the Austrian 
railroad system consumed almost half a million tons more coal in 1916 than in 1913.87 
The Hungarian half of the Monarchy began to experience industrial slowdowns due to 
coal shortages, and these slowdowns would later blossom into full-fledged industrial 
stoppages and widespread unemployment.88 
Coal shortages, like food shortages, could not be easily remedied through 
purchases from foreign markets. It would seem that coal would be less problematic than 
other commodities, as the vast majority of the coal necessary to cover the difference 
between domestic production and demand was imported from German mines in Upper 
Silesia.89 After the imposition of the British blockade, however, German coal demand 
could no longer be met from more convenient sources in northern France and Britain, and 
Germany was thrown back to relying solely on domestic supplies for coal. Shipments 
86.  Riedl, Die Industrie Österreichs, 275. Iron and steel industry figures are 21.6 million tons for 1914 and 
25.  4 million tons for 1916.
87.  Homann-Herimberg, Die Kohlenversorgung in Österreich, XXXIX. 7,803,000 tons in 1913 v 
8,470,859 tons in 1916.
88.  Peter Pastor, “The Home Front in Hungary, 1914-1918,” in East Central European Society in World 
War I, ed. Béla Király and Nándor Dreisziger (Boulder: Columbia University Press, 1985). 128.
89.  Homann-Herimberg, Die Kohlenversorgung in Österreich, 6.
from Silesia never entirely stopped, but they were sharply curtailed. German imports 
plummeted after the outbreak of war and never recovered.90 These unpleasant realities 
looked even more threatening when juxtaposed with the Austrian production figures, 
which showed a net increase of approximately 1.3 million tons of anthracite in 1916 over 
1913 and a drop of no less than 4.1 million tons of lignite produced over the same 
period.91
The difficulty of increasing anthracite imports from Germany, the anemic increase 
in domestic production, and the vastly increasing demand all conspired to ensure that 
maintaining production became a top priority. In this environment, the coal miners as a 
group took on a vastly increased importance relative to their peacetime role. Pre-war 
expectations of a short war had been thoroughly disappointed, and the victor, it seemed, 
would be decided more by productive capacity than by brilliant generalship. Control over 
the labor of Ostravan miners, then, became an even more critical strategic asset. 
The winter of 1915-1916 was not a good time to be a Habsburg subject, and a still 
worse time to be a Moravian coal miner. The Ostravan miners had endured the first 
winter of war, but the progressive deterioration of Habsburg harvests due to lack of labor, 
lack of imported nitrates for fertilizer, and the progressive tightening of the allied 'Hunger 
Blockade' led to increasing hardships. The 1915 potato harvest was 82% of the 1913 
figures, while wheat was at 71% of 1913 figures and rye was at 62%. Barley and oats 
were even worse, at 48% and 44% respectively.92 Imports from abroad were largely 
unavailable – some Romanian wheat could be purchased, but Germany was facing its 
90.  Ibid., 7. German anthracite imports dropped nearly three million tons in 1914, and further in 1915, 
representing a drop of approximately thirty percent from pre-war figures.
91.  Homann-Herimberg, Die Kohlenversorgung in Österreich, II-III. For anthracite – 16,336,604 tons in 
1913 v 17,601,711 in 1916. For lignite – 27,461,632 tons in 1913 v 23,199,896 tons in 1916.
92.  Hautmann, “Hunger is ein schlechter Koch,” 665.
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own food crisis and Italy's entry into the war on May 23rd, 1915, cut off supplies through 
the peninsula. Hungary, being a far more agricultural economy than Austria, maintained a 
better standard of living for its citizens during the war but refused to sufficiently supply 
Austria. Hungary sent food shipments to Austria only grudgingly, and sought to wring as 
much as possible out of the Austrian government for them. Even the 1915 crop failures 
failed to move the Hungarians.93 The cost of living in the entire Empire was also 
drastically increasing; by June 1916 the cost of living for the general population had 
increased by 217%, and for working-class families such as those of coal miners inflation 
had increased the cost of living by 282%.94
These general woes were compounded by regulatory shifts that choked off the 
mine district's ability to procure foodstuffs. Since the beginning of the war brought in its 
wake “limitless extortion” in terms of food prices, the pre-war practice of individual food 
purchase was no longer sufficient to supply the miners. The mining companies, therefore, 
undertook to provide for their workers' needs by purchasing foodstuffs in bulk from 
wherever possible and conveying them to worker co-operatives (Konsumvereine) which 
sold the foodstuffs at cost directly to the workers. Up until the strike wave broke out, the 
office established for this purpose by the mining companies had spent 1.5 million crowns 
on grains, fats, meat, and beans for their workers.95 All available avenues were exploited 
93.  Haselsteiner, “The Habsburg Empire in World War I: Mobilization of Food Supplies,” 93. This is not to 
say that the Hungarian population was well-fed, but Hungary was consistently in a much better position to 
feed its population than Austria was.
94.  Richard Georg Plaschka, “The Army and Internal Conflict in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 1918,” in 
East Central European Society in World War I, ed. Béla Király and Nánder Dreisziger (Boulder: Columbia 
University Press, 1985). 342.
95.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 61, Nr. 46/6. "Fragebogen I." April 5th, 1916. The situation was 
described by Senior Mine Councillor Fillunger, chairman of the Director's Conference for the Ostrava-
Karviná coal basin, in response to a series of questions posed by Jaroslav Petr, representing Military 
Command Cracow.
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in order to acquire the necessary foodstuffs. The mining firms sent their purchasing 
agents abroad, across the border into Upper Silesia or Congress Poland, to purchase from 
the black market wherever possible, even trading shipments of coal under the table for 
shipments of food.96
This system worked as well as could be expected during a period of immense food 
shortages, but it relied crucially on the possibility of purchasing and shipping food from 
other districts and states. The imposition of rationing and food controls in April 1915, 
though, threatened that possibility.97 The Imperial and Royal government, in an attempt to 
rationalize supply, decreed on the 16th of September, 1915, that all foodstuffs brought into 
the Monarchy must go through the newly erected War Provisions Transfer Agency 
(Kriegsgetreideverkehrsanstalt), cutting Ostrava-Karviná off from what German supplies 
were available. The progressively worsening food crisis also impelled other counties and 
districts within the Monarchy to enact export bans on foodstuffs.98 These bans created 
“enormous difficulties” in the provisioning process and left Ostrava-Karviná dangerously 
undersupplied.99
The coal district's Directoral Conference first brought the worsening supply crisis 
to the attention of the central government with the submission of a report of to the 
Ministry of Public Works on the 24th of February, 1916. Bread shortages had already set 
in, and no improvement was in sight. Such a state of events, they wrote, would not only 
96.  Die Regelung der Arbeitsverhältnisse, 214-215. The covert coal trading was almost certainly 
undertaken with the government's implicit consent.
97.  Hautmann, “Hunger ist ein schlechter Koch,” 667. Rationing for bread and flour introduced in April 
1915, for sugar in March 1916, for milk in May 1916, coffee in June 1916, and fat in Sept. 1916. 
98.  Riedl, Die Industrie Österreichs, 96; Die Regelung der Arbeitsverhältnisse, 214.
99.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 61-46/6, Nr. 5. "Bericht." Jaroslav Petr, April 6th, 1916.
29
decrease coal production but also put pressure on the “disciplined and until now 
irreproachably patriotic orientation of the labor force...”100 It may be more accurate to say 
that draconian military discipline under the War Production Law had more to do with the 
"irreproachably patriotic orientation" of the miners than any inherent love for the 
Habsburg state. The Directoral Conference was correct, though, that privation was 
quickly breaking down the workers' labor discipline.101
The forecasts had not been sufficiently pessimistic, and by the end of March some 
mine workers had been reduced to consuming the slop set aside for pigs.102 No betterment 
in the provisioning situation was expected, the work remained strenuous, and the starving 
miners had reached their limit, despite the draconian penalties for protest. The strikes 
began in the Silesian area, on Friday, the 31st of March. Forty-seven hungry pushcart 
operators (Hundstößer) and signalmen (Anschläger) working the early shift at the Salm 
shaft refused to enter the mine and begin their back-breaking labor. These workers later 
persuaded the hewers working the afternoon shift to lay down their tools and join their 
strike.103 
A frantic telephone report was sent to the Military Station Command for 
Moravská Ostrava along with an urgent request for military support. Depending on the 
interpretation, these workers were guilty of either insubordination, in refusing commands 
100.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 61, Nr. 46/6(47). "Direktoren-Konferenz des Ostrau-Karwiner 
Steinkohlenrevieres." February 24th, 1916.
101.  Huemos, "'Kartoffeln her,” 260. Before mid-1916, War Production Law disciplinary measures 
suppressed strike participation. Afterwards, such harsh treatment actually increased participation in strike 
movements.
102.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 61, Nr. 46/6(Präs. 1658/L). "Bericht." April 9th, 1916.
103.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 61, Nr. 46/6(5). "Bericht des k.k. Oblt.-Auditor Dr. Michael 
Eckstein über seine Amtshandlung in Mähr.-Ostrau." April 5th, 1916. 47 men were involved at the Salm 
shaft at this stage.
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to work, or treason, in abandoning their posts. The head of the Military Station 
Command, Franz Brandstätter, responded with eighty men under his own command, and 
found when he arrived that the nearby Ludwig and Wetter shafts had also joined the strike 
– two hundred workers refused to begin work at the Ludwig shaft, and an unknown 
number at Wetter. Negotiations with the Ludwig workers failed, but “as the workers 
would not resume work willingly, their entry into the mine was insisted upon.”104 By the 
time Brandstätter's detachment had threatened and beaten the Ludwig workers 
sufficiently to convince them that coal mining was healthier than striking, the workers 
from the Wetter shaft had fled the area.
Following receipt of the news, Military Command Cracow sent the Coal Cadre 
Inspector for Ostrava-Karviná, Captain of the Gendarmarie Cavalry Josef Woitsch, to the 
site. As the plenipotentiary representative of the Military Command, Woitsch was 
entrusted with quashing labor unrest throughout  the entire coal district. This would not, 
however, be an easy task. The next day, April 1st, 1916, the strikes at the Salm, Wetter, 
and Ludwig shafts had gained considerable popular sympathy, and Woitsch acted quickly 
to stamp out the spark before it could spread further. An additional one and a half 
companies of infantry were dispatched and sizeable patrols were sent to track down 
striking workers, drag them from their homes, and drive them into their mine shafts, there 
to be billeted (kaserniert) in the mine. Woitsch's forces imprisoned approximately three 
hundred workers this way.
The sparks, though, had flown wide, and the strikes continued to spread. The next 
evening three additional shafts struck -  the Johann-Maria, the Trinity, and the Michaelis 
104.  Ibid., emphasis mine. “Da die Arbeit freiwillig nicht aufgenommen wurde, wurde darauf bestanden,  
daß eingefahren wird.”
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shafts. Another half-company of infantry was brought in to suppress them, and Woitsch 
dispatched more patrols to break down striking miners' doors, haul them to their mine 
shafts, and pen them there. Then the Hermengild shaft struck, on the 3rd of April. By then, 
38 miners were under formal military arrest, either in the coal district or en route to 
Teschen for a military tribunal. Hundreds more were living in coal shafts under armed 
guard. Two companies of infantry occupied seven mine shafts, and the strike wave had 
yet to reach the Moravian part of the coal district. On the 4th of April, this was no longer 
the case, as forty-seven youth laborers refused to enter the Alexander shaft, eighty-three 
men refused to work at the Franz shaft, and another one hundred and thirty-five men 
assigned to the afternoon shift joined them. The entire afternoon shift at the Georg shaft 
put down their tools and took up the strike, and minor disturbances marred the change of 
shifts at the Ignaz shaft.105 To further discommode authorities, an infantryman engaged in 
suppressing the strike, the former worker Alexander Pollaczek of Militia Regiment 31, 
was arrested and imprisoned for sedition.106
The 4th of April was the high-water mark for the active stage of the strike wave. 
Eleven shafts and thousands of men had thrown down their tools by then, and scores were 
under arrest for high treason with hundreds more held at bayonet point in their mine 
shafts. The next week was not so heated. There were occasional demonstrations, such as 
at the Tiefbau shaft and the Alpinen shaft on the 8th. The afternoon shift at the Louis shaft 
refused to work on the 10th, but after a heated exchange with their cadre commander the 
majority of the miners resumed work peacefully. A number of workers, typically youths, 
105.  Ibid.
106.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 61, Nr. 46/6(5). "Bericht des k.k. Oblt.-Auditor Dr. Michael 
Eckstein über seine Amtshandlung in Mähr.-Ostrau." April 5th, 1916.
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were arrested during each of these incidents.107 The military had broken the back of the 
protests.
This is not to say that labor unrest in the Ostrava Karwin coal district had ended, 
but it moved into a more passive phase. Passive resistance in the form of sharply reduced 
productivity and reluctance to work sharply reduced coal output while avoiding more 
easily punishable demonstrations or absenteeism.108 This transition was likely the result 
of Woitsch's campaign of terror against the striking workers, but there is no definitive 
evidence of this available. Complaints, threats, and rumors were rampant, though, and the 
authorities nervously hoped that they could stamp out the fuse before it reached the 
powder keg. 
The district captain (Bezirkshauptmann) brought rumors of a general strike, to be 
called on Monday, April 10th, to the attention of Military Command Cracow and the State 
Police Bureau on the 8th of April.109 The foreman of the Theresien shaft received an 
anonymous letter on the 9th demanding the release of the arrested miners and threatening 
a general strike. A duration of fourteen days was set for a reply, and the message was 
signed by 'all old mining folk' (Alle alten Bergleute).110 The same day another anonymous 
letter was received by the Coal Cadre Commandant of the Kohen-Ecker shaft, demanding 
general wage increases. The letter concluded with the bold claim that “Martial law does 
not impress us, as mining folk do not fear death by execution.”111 
107.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 1-2, Nr. 1-1/3(9). "Bericht." April 11th, 1916.
108.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 61, Nr. 46/6. "Bericht." Ach, April 9th, 1916.
109.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 61, Nr. 46/6. "Bericht." Ach, April 8th, 1916; ÖstA/KA Zst KM 
1916, Abt. 5. Carton 61, Nr. 46/6 "Telefondepesche an das Mil. Kmdo Krakau." April 8th, 1916.
110.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 1-2, Nr. 1-1/3(9). "Bericht." Novák, April 9th, 1916.
111.  Ibid.
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The labor force was not advancing an unreasonable set of demands. In terms of 
their formal demands, they requested in some cases the release of their imprisoned 
comrades but mostly they called on state authorities to more adequately compensate them 
for their dangerous and backbreaking labor.112 Some requests were also received for 
cheaper food. In one such case, the workers cited an inability to maintain coal output at 
their current negligible caloric input for more than a week.113 This was likely true, as 
labor-intensive occupations such as mining required workers to consume at least 3900 
calories daily in order to maintain their strength.114 The State Police, however, understood 
it as a threat to undertake passive resistance.115 Most written demands, though, related 
only to wage increases. Given the basis for the strikes, and the informal opinions 
collected by various government investigators, though, it is very likely that wage 
demands were advanced as a proxy for direct provisioning rather than for their own 
sake.116 Whether such was a conscious strategy, a reflection of lack of faith in government 
provisioning, or simply habit remains speculative.
Wages had increased between twelve and fourteen percent for all positions from 
the beginning of the war to the outbreak of the strikes, an increase which “bore no 
proportion to the price increases for all necessary articles, amounting to 150-200 percent” 
112.  One such instance was reported at the Theresa shaft, where a general uprising was threatened if 
fifteen imprisoned workers from their shaft were not released. See ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 
61, Nr. 46/6. "Bericht." Novák, April 10th, 1916.
113.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 61, Nr. 46/6. "Bericht." Ach, April 9th, 1916.
114.  Hautmann, “Hunger ist ein schlechter Koch,” 669.
115.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 61, Nr. 46/6. "Bericht." Ach, April 9th, 1916.
116.  See for example Jaroslav Petr's summary of worker's demands “collected from conversations with 
workers of various coal mines”, which focuses almost exclusively on provisioning. ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, 
Abt. 5. Carton 61, Nr. 46/6(5). "Bericht." Jaroslav Petr, April 6th, 1916.
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over pre-war figures.117 Considering the inflation figures, the miners' demands were in 
fact quite moderate, especially as draconian punishments for insubordination and protest 
had been consistently exercised to short-circuit demands for higher wages.118 The average 
pre-war (1913) wage for a miner in the Ostrava-Karviná district was five and a third 
crowns a day.119 The wage demands at the Georg shaft, for example, were only for a wage 
of seven and a half crowns per shift for miners, hand workers, senior machine operators, 
senior stokers, and similarly situated workers; five to five and a half crowns a shift for 
junior machine operators, junior stokers, and the like; and for unskilled labor a wage of 
three and a half to four crowns a shift. The workers at the Francis shaft submitted similar 
demands, for wages between three and a half and seven and a half crowns daily, as well 
as a 'War Bonus' of seventeen percent.120 For purposes of comparison, Josef Woitsch 
estimated that lodging and upkeep (Kost und Quartier) at this time at between eighty and 
ninety crowns a month.121 All told, their demands constituted an increase of slightly more 
than fifty percent over the pre-war 1914 figures. 122 The Ostrava-Karviná labor force did 
not ask for much. They were to get even less.
The most serious move to placate the miners through concessions rather than to 
coerce them back into a supine state of obedience took place on the 9th of April, 1916. A 
ministerial conference took place in Vienna, under the aegis of the Ministry of Public 
117.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 1-2, Nr. 1/3(7). "Ad Erlass Präs. No. 6645-IV." April 12th, 
1916.
118.  Die Regelung der Arbeitsverhältnisse, 189.
119.  “Lohnsteigerung in Industrie und Landwirtschaft,” Neue Freie Presse, Jan. 1st, 1918, Morgenblatt.
120.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 61, Nr. 46/6. "Bericht." Novák, April 10th, 1916.
121.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 61, Nr. 46/6. "Antrag des militärischen Delegierten des 
Militärkommandos." Undated.
122.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 1-2, Nr. 1/3(3). "Bericht." April 7th, 1916.
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Works, aiming to resolve the strike movement. News of the outcome of the conference 
had reached Ostrava-Karviná by that evening, and the ministers' concessions were 
singularly unimpressive. The ministerial conference had conceded an additional nine 
percent wage increase across the board, which brought the total wage increases over the 
course of the war to between 21 and 24 percent, depending on position. This increase was 
only wrung out of the mining concerns through pressure from the Ministry of Public 
Works, which conceded a ten percent increase in the allowed price for a cubic meter of 
coal to compensate the mining concerns for the increased payroll costs.
In addition, the conference relaxed the rigid military discipline under which the 
miners labored, though only superficially. The limits on absenteeism were relaxed, in so 
far as that one could be absent for two full shifts per month before monetary penalties 
were imposed, and more numerous instances of absenteeism only brought the loss of half 
of one's supplemental war payment. The previous limit had been considerably sharper, as 
one absentee shift would be forgiven before the worker forfeited the entirety of their 
monthly supplemental payment, but the new regulations could not be seen as major 
concessions to the workers' demands.123
The transition from penury and starvation to a slightly less penurious state of 
starvation was not a compelling one, especially as there was no real prospect of a 
loosening of the harsh military regime which ruled the coal district. The State Police 
Bureau reported that the workers assigned to the Luis shaft “declared themselves in 
disagreement with the nine percent increase,” and the mood of the workers “was not a 
123.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 1-2, Nr. 1/3(8). "Bericht." Novák, April 12th, 1916. The wage 
increases under discussion (Teuerungszulagen) were administratively distinct from base wages and were 
conceived of as a temporary palliative to ameliorate inflationary pressures rather than as wage increases, 
which had a more permanent character. 
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good one even still.”124 These workers, when told by management of the Vienna 
conference and its decision, condemned the nine percent wage increase as “far too 
meager” and only reluctantly entered the mine. Lt. Perl, their Cadre Commandant, 
ordered them to work in his official capacity, and as disobeying such an order was a 
military crime, the two young workers who still refused to work were then arrested for 
insubordination.125 The civilian district administration was in full agreement with the 
disappointed workers– the district leadership's conference of the 11th of April, 1916 
“found the concessions completely insufficient.”126
Regardless of the rumors and threats of a general strike, though, Monday came 
and went without anything remarkable occurring. The County Presidium in Troppau 
reported that approximately ten percent of workers were absent for the morning shift, 
which “perhaps has something to do with the fact that today is Monday. Otherwise 
everything is peaceful.”127 By the 12th of April the strike wave was effectively over, 
though occasional minor disturbances would continue for some time. 
In total, the movement had encompassed over forty shafts in sixteen locales, with 
the most important mining concerns being those of the Vítkovíce steel works, the 
Austrian Mining and Iron Works Society, also a major steel producer, and the Emperor 
Ferdinand Northern Railway.128 At the height of the unrest, the Military Court in Teschen 
reported that criminal charges had been levied against 1669 persons, though the bulk 
124.  Ibid.
125.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 1-2, Nr. 1/3(9). "Bericht." Novák, April 11th, 1916.
126.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 1-2, Nr. 1/3(8). "Bericht." Novák, April 12th, 1916.
127.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 61, Nr. 46/6. "Bericht." Novák, April 10th, 1916.
128.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 61, Nr. 46/6. "Fragebogen II." April 5th, 1916
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were released on their own recognizance. Over the course of the strikes several hundred 
workers were imprisoned or sent to Crakow or Teschen to undergo court-martials.129
The militarized labor regime in Ostrava-Karviná had begun to unravel. The 
radical transformation in labor relations sparked by the constellation of pre-war labor 
laws maintained production amid worsening conditions for almost two full years, but 
starvation and penury had finally eroded the military's coercive labor discipline. This 
breakdown posed a unique threat to the Habsburg state. Not only was labor unrest in the 
coal district a threat to industrial output and thus to the Monarchy's security against 
external adversaries, but the re-definition of the relationship between the state and the 
miners of the coal district also meant that unrest threatened internal collapse. By defining 
labor unrest as treason, the 1916 strike wave, in a sense, was an organized rebellion 
against state authority. By challenging the state's ability to manage, direct, and discipline 
its subjects, Ostrava-Karviná's coal miners thus threatened the legitimacy of the state and 
its ability to mobilize its citizenry in service of the war effort.
129.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 61, Nr. 46/6(5). "IV. Bericht der k.k. Feldgerichtsexpositur in 
Teschen. Erstattet durch k.k. Oblt. Aud. Dr. Steiner." April 5th, 1916.
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V. A Constant Danger: The Government Response
The threat mining unrest posed to both the external and internal security of the 
Monarchy demanded a response. The immediate governmental response actualized the 
threat of armed violence contained within the militarized disciplinary framework put in 
place at the outbreak of the war. Within the logic of this framework, the striking workers 
were engaged in mutiny, which had to be suppressed as quickly and efficiently as 
possible. Immediately upon hearing news of the miners' refusal to work at Salm, 
therefore, Military Station Command in Moravská Ostrava dispatched eighty men of the 
31st Militia Regiment from the local garrison to the site, and as the unrest spread more 
and more men were sent to stamp it out at bayonet point. 
Military action went beyond merely breaking up demonstrations. Infantrymen 
rounded up absentee workers in their homes and placed them under arrest.130 These 
patrols hunted down striking workers, primarily the single workers who formed the bulk 
of the strike movement and the majority of its ringleaders, and herded them into their 
mine shafts at gun point. Joining them there were those married miners deemed 
dangerous to public order. There they would stay until they abandoned their resistance 
and took up their tools again.
The open application of violence, however, was not a permanent solution. The 
disciplinary framework functioned best through the implicit threat of violence, routinized 
and undertaken administratively. Open violence was the last resort, an emergency 
130.  Plaschka, “The Army and Internal Conflict,” 344.
measure undertaken in response to a collective challenge to the authority and legitimacy 
of the state. The campaign of open and widespread violence presented just as much of a 
threat to coal production as did the waves of strikes which brought about the necessity for 
military intervention. The figures for the decline in production caused by the strike wave 
and the following military response are, unfortunately, unavailable, but was considered 
drastic by contemporaneous observers.131 The prospect of a repetition of the strikewave in 
an even more damaging form was, then, a prospect to be feared. The militarized 
discipline which had served the state so well since the war began had finally failed to 
maintain labor discipline. As such, these strikes marked not an isolated episode, but 
instead reflected a systemic breakdown in the exercise of state authority in the Ostrava-
Karviná district. Recourse to violence was the last prop of state power in the district.
As soon as the 31st Militia Regiment managed to reduce the incidence of new 
strikes to a minimum, the local authorities as well as the central government began a 
debate over what measures could be taken to eliminate renewed outbreaks of labor unrest. 
The demands of the miners themselves were secondary to this debate. In keeping with the 
logic of the state's disciplinary framework, the miners' interests were only relevant in so 
far as they simplified state management of coal production. Therefore, the guiding 
question was, as the representative from the Ministry for Home Defence, Dr. Kelewer, 
put it, “which measures provide the most hope for assuring that the operations of the coal 
mines will no longer be disturbed?”132 
The Moravian governor (Statthalter), representative of the central government in 
Vienna and chief officer of the executive branch in Moravia, urged the imposition of an 
131.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 61, Nr. 46/6. "Bericht." Ach, April 9th, 1916.
132.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 1-2, Nr. 1/3(6). "Einsichtsakt." April 12th, 1916.
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even harsher regime of military discipline as the only effective solution, writing to the 
Minister of the Interior at the height of the strike wave to urge declaration of martial law 
in the Moravian areas of the coal district. Northern Moravia had been removed from the 
Zone of Army Operations in October of 1915, due to the crushing Austro-German 
victories on the Russian Front, a move which represented a symbolic though not a real 
weakening of militarized labor discipline.  The outbreak of the strikes, though, persuaded 
the governor to formally request that the area be resubordinated to the AOK.133 The 
Silesian half of the basin had never left the Zone, and thus that half of the basin remained, 
as since the Imperial Decree of the 25th of July, 1914, under military law and direct 
military administration.
The Moravian governor advanced two arguments. The first was that it was a 
necessary measure towards unifying the entire district in the sense that the administrative 
and legal regimes applicable would be the same in both the Silesian and the Moravian 
areas. Even though in practice the miners in the Moravian area of the coal district labored 
under a system of military discipline just as severe as those in the Silesian area, the 
administrative routines in each half through which this discipline was exercised were 
somewhat different. The governor hoped that unifying these practices would create a 
more efficient and effective system of discipline. His second argument was that this 
resubordination would prevent a widening of the strike wave into the Moravian area of 
the district. As this had already occurred by the time the governor submitted his request, 
it seems superfluous. Further, that the strike wave had originated in the Silesian half of 
the coal district would seem to contradict his assumptions. Nevertheless, the best 
133.  SUA, PMV/R, sg. 22 gen, čj. 7253/1916, reprinted in: SUA, Sborník dokumentů, 3:107-108. The 
request was sent on the 4th of April, 1916.
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solution, as the Moravian governor conceived it, was to extend and harshen the 
framework of military discipline which had sufficed to maintain order and productivity 
over the previous two years. How exactly this could be done remained unaddressed.134
Local administration officials agreed with the governor. The district 
administration (Bezirkshauptmannschaft) felt that the only solution to the problems 
plaguing the coal district was to strengthen military rule. Arguing for the imposition of 
military law, the district captain advanced the claim that imposition of martial law in the 
Moravian area of the coal district would restore equality of treatment between the 
workers employed by shafts in Moravia and those in Silesia, since Silesia's continued 
incorportation into the Zone of Army Operations meant that workers there were 
technically though not practically under more legal constraints than those in Moravia.135 
This state of affairs left officials worried that the strike movement would become far 
more dangerous in the Moravian area than it had in the Silesian zone, already under 
martial law. These fears had been heightened by several instances of sabotage in Silesian 
shafts. Finally, the imposition of military law could calm the populace, if the militarized 
workers were to be provided with the benefits of military service, namely supplies from 
military reserves, to counterbalance the detriments of the draconian disciplinary 
regime.136 The reinclusion of the area in the Zone of Army Operations, then, would in 
134.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 61, Nr. 46/6(5). "IV. Bericht der k.k. Feldgerichtsexpositur in 
Teschen. Erstattet durch k.k. Oblt. Aud. Dr. Steiner." April 5th, 1916.
135.  The Imperial Decrees of  the 25th and 31st of July, 1914, gave the commanding theater general in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina and Dalmatia and the Army High Command on the Russian front the right to issue 
decrees and orders to the civilian population on any matter within the competence of the civilian head of 
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their opinion serve to reassert the subjugation of the mining population to the state. An 
appeal to that end was sent to the Ministry of the Interior. Practically speaking, though, 
the effects of such a shift would have been nil.137
The civilian ministries of the central government, though, were considerably more 
willing to contemplate solutions which did not involve punitive military discipline. Of 
course, these solutions were similarly unreal, but the reasoning behind them was quite 
different. On the following day, the 6th of April, 1916, a conference was convened by 
telephone, under the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior and under the leadership of 
one of its representatives, Baron von Handl. Also present were Mine Councillor Reissig 
and Mine Secretary Novák from the Ministry of the Interior, Section Chief Schober 
representing the Ministry of Justice, and Dr. Kelewer for the Ministry of Public Works. 
The agenda had only one item – resolving the Ostrava-Karviná strike wave.
The conclusion of all present was to confirm that “the root of the laborer 
movement was obviously economic, and that the most pressing issue was clearly the 
amelioration of the difficulties in the provision and cost of foodstuffs and clothes as far as 
possible.” The Ministry of the Interior reported that the necessary measures to provision 
the district with potatoes and beans “had already been set in motion.”138 By conceding 
that the miners had legitimate grievances against the state, the Ministry of the Interior 
demonstrated a much wider appreciation of the dynamics at work in the relationship 
between the mining population of Ostrava-Karviná and the state. Military Command 
Cracow neatly summarized the reciprocal nature of this relationship and the dangers 
Teschen. Erstattet durch k.k. Oblt. Aud. Dr. Steiner." April 5th, 1916. It remains unclear whether the incident 
referred to was in fact intentional sabotage or instead caused by incompetence or inattention.
137.  Ibid.
138.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 1-2, Nr. 1/3(6). "Amtsbericht." April 12th, 1916. Such 
measures did not, as far as is apparent, have any effect.
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which a monomaniacal emphasis on military discipline entailed in a report pointing out 
that, “military coercion without the necessary provision for welfare and existence thereby 
entailed is a constant danger and apt to evoke severe unrest and to make calamitous 
methods of compulsion necessary”.139 The central government's civilian ministries, at 
least, preferred to make the necessary provisions for welfare and existence rather than 
hope for the success of calamitous methods of compulsion.
In addition to attempting to emphasize reducing the miners' privation, the 
conference also debated the local and state administrations' appeals to secure coal 
production and order by further strengthening military discipline in the coal district. The 
ministerial conference was strongly opposed to re-attaching the Moravian areas to the 
Zone of Army Operations, and the appeals were “overwhelmingly rejected”.140 The most 
influential arguments against the possiblity were that it would be ridiculous on the one 
hand and superfluous on the other. 
The absurdity of declaring that the northern areas of Moravia constituted a front 
line against the Russian army was self-evident, as the Russian army had at that point 
retreated beyond the eastern borders of Congress Poland, approximately three hundred 
miles away. That such a change was unnecessary, though, is the more interesting 
argument. The assembled officials concluded that “those crimes here considered, typical 
for mine worker strikes, can be dealt with under the statutes of martial law even if the 
area in question belongs to the hinterland.”141 Those mine workers in the service of the 
Labor Militia (Landsturmpflichtige) were already, due to their legal status, subordinated 
139.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 61, Nr. 46/6(Präs. 1658/L). "Bericht." April 9th, 1916.
140.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 1-2, Nr. 1/3(6). "Amtsbericht." April 12th, 1916.
141.  Ibid.
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to military discipline and military justice. They were, in a sense, soldiers on active duty. 
As such, insubordination, mutiny, or abandoning their post were already punishable by 
court-martials or summary judgements, and miners were in fact being punished under 
these clauses both before and after the conference met.142
Those workers outside of the Militia laborer category were also liable to military 
justice. The same imperial decree that imposed military courts for a wide range of civilian 
activities decreed uprising (Aufruhr), malicious damage or arson against industrial plant 
or facilities, or aiding and abetting such, as military crimes.143 That these crimes, when 
committed by members of the labor militia, were military crimes in the strict sense of the 
word, allowed any aid or co-operation on the part of the approximately fifteen percent of 
the labor force comprised by non-militia laborers to be punished under the aiding and 
abetting clause of the Code of Military Justice.144 That fifteen percent, though generally 
consisting of youths under seventeen and therefore unable to be inducted into the labor 
militia, was also under the slightly looser category of laborers under the War Production 
Law and therefore liable to military justice in cases of abandoning or subverting their 
labor obligations, which is to say, striking.145
The effective outcome of these legal categories was that the work force in the 
Ostrava-Karviná basin was that little remained to be further militarized. There was 
nowhere left to go. It was this increasing overlap between civilian labor and military 
142.  Articles 147-148, 161-164, and 433 of the Austro-Hungarian Code of Military Justice. See 
Reichsgesetzblatt (1912), LV. Stück, Nr. 130. 441-531. 
143.  Reichsgesetzblatt (1914). LXXI. Stück, Nr. 156. 821.
144.  Article 14 of the Austro-Hungarian Code of Military Justice. See Reichsgesetzblatt (1912), LV. Stück, 
Nr. 130. 443.
145.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 61, Nr. 46/6(5). "Bericht des k.k. Oblt.-Auditor Dr. Michael 
Eckstein über seine Amtshandlung in Mähr.-Ostrau." April 5th, 1916.
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service which convinced those present at the conference of the 6th of April that the 
imposition of military law would be senseless. This view was confirmed by the War 
Ministry's representative, Auditor-General Killian, and the conclusions of those present 
were submitted to the Military Commandants of Crakow and of Vienna.146
Military Command Vienna agreed with the ministerial conference's conclusions.147 
Noting that less than a third of the absolute minimum necessary quantity of potatoes had 
reached Moravská Ostrava in the previous few days, the Military Commandant for 
Vienna located the cause of the problem in a lack of sufficient provisioning and conceded 
that “a one-time provisioning will not suffice...especially as the laborers would then 
believe that it was not a lack of foodstuffs but a lack of the good will to provide them”.148 
In this view, lack of discipline was not the problem, privation was. It was the state, rather 
than the miners, which had failed to hold up the implicit bargain underpinning labor 
discipline in the coal district. Unfortunately, the State Police Office reported on the 13th of 
April that, despite promises of “great quantities of potatoes and beans already rolling 
towards Moravská Ostrava...absolutely nothing has arrived”.149
Ultimately, though, the civilian ministries in Vienna lacked the authority to dictate 
which measures would be taken to resolve the strike wave and prevent its reoccurence. 
More problematic, though, was that they lacked the power to do so as well. The resources 
and organization necessary to consistently supply the coal district was beyond the reach 
146.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 1-2, Nr. 1/3(6). "Amtsbericht." April 12th, 1916.
147.  Military Command Vienna constituted one of a number of Landwehr regional commands responsible 
for internal military operations.
148.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 1-2, Nr. 1/3(7). "Ad Erlass Präs. No. 6645-IV." April 12th, 
1916.
149.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 1-2, Nr. 1/3(5). "Bericht." April 13th, 1916.
46
of the Habsburg state in 1916. The initiative, then, laid in the hands of the Army High 
Command. The AOK consistently spoke out for a military solution, urging the re-
attachment of the entirety of the basin into the Zone of Army Operations as the most 
efficient method of handling the problem.150 And before Franz Josef's death, on 
November 21st, 1916, the Army High Command exercised very broad discretionary 
authority, and even more informal influence. Accordingly, then, the AOK sent an abrupt 
notice to the Imperial and Royal War Ministry on the 14th of April, 1916, announcing that 
as of the previous day “the political region of Moravská Ostrava has been attached to the 
Zone of Army Operations”.151 The district leadership in Moravská Ostrava heard about it 
second-hand, from the Lemberg Military Command.152
That the decision went to the proponents of further militarizing labor discipline 
instead of those who argued for fulfilling the terms of the implicit contract underpinning 
labor mobilization in the First World War accelerated the growth of labor radicalism and 
weakened the Habsburg state. Though neither the civilian nor the military solutions had 
any real substance, the victory for militarization proponents carried a symbolic weight, 
removing whatever small chance there may have been of a co-operative relationship 
between the Ostrava-Karviná labor force and the state. The privation which had 
undermined adherence to labor discipline and which underpinned the strike wave was to 
increase rather than decrease, and reliance on the exercise of naked violence would prove 
utterly unable to rebuild labor discipline in the face of starvation.
150.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 1-2, Nr. 1/3(7). "k.u.k. Armeeoberkommando an das k.u.k. 
Kriegsministerium." April 13th, 1916.
151.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 61, Nr. 46/11. "Einbeziehung des politischen Bez. Mhr. Ostrau 
i.d.Bereich der Armee im Felde." April 14th, 1916.
152.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1916, Abt. 5. Carton 1-2, Nr. 1/3(7). "Bericht." April 14th, 1916.
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VI. In deinem Lager ist Österreich: The Beginning of the End
On the 19th of May, 1917, Military Command Cracow submitted a report to the 
War Ministry regarding “the renewed strike movements in the Ostrava-Karviná coal 
district.” The cause, they reported, was “shortage of foodstuffs, especially due to the 
discontinuous and interrupted delivery of foodstuffs.”153 Their recommendations were 
familiar. Military Command Cracow urged continuous imports of foodstuffs, a 
commission to investigate (and presumably increase) workers' wages, “barracksing of the 
workers, their supplies, and their clothes, and as most promising of success, transitioning 
the coal district to full military administration.”154 This last point referenced the 
contemplated appointment of a military plenipotentiary to administer the coal district, 
which was to bear fruit three weeks later. The appointment of Major-General Heinrich 
von Naumann as the plenipotentiary of Army High Command for the Ostrava-Karviná 
district took place on the 6th of June, 1917.155 
The original decision to mobilize Habsburg labor behind the war effort through a 
system of militarized labor discipline had proved determinative in the evolution of labor 
discipline in the Ostrava-Karviná district. The breakdown of the system of administrative 
coercion created by the War Production Law left nothing to take its place other than the 
exercise of naked force. By 1916, neither the Army High Command nor General von 
153.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1917, Abt. 10. Carton 38, Nr. 41/7(634). "Ausstandsbewegung im Kohlenreviere 
Mähr.-Ostrau – Ursache – Anträge." May 19th, 1917.
154.  Ibid.
155.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1917. No Carton. (Präs. 1-7/74). "Über die nachträgliche Beförderung des GM. Mit 
Tit.u.Char. d.Rhstds. Heinrich von NAUMANN." July 30th, 1917.
Naumann had the ability to meaningfully alter the dynamic in place in the coal district by 
1916 – there are only so many ways to threaten the firing squad.
The very severity of the disciplinary regime originally established in the coal 
district became counterproductive, with harsh treatment inciting rather than hindering 
strike movements.156  Though successful in maintaining production during the first stages 
of the First World War, the disciplinary regime had exhausted its capacity to mobilize 
labor at the very moment in which Wilhelmine Germany was launching the Hindenburg 
Program and Great Britain was beginning conscription. State violence against strikes and 
hunger protests began to increase both qualitatively and quantitatively, and by 1918 the 
armed forces were routinely firing upon crowds in the Bohemian lands.157 
By 1916 the working population of the coal district, radicalized by privation and 
violence, mobilized themselves behind peace instead of the war effort and began to 
openly threaten to cut off war production.158 Strike actions became increasingly 
commonplace, and coal production in Ostrava-Karviná, as in the Monarchy as a whole, 
began to sink and finally to collapse.159 This process reached its apogee in January of 
1918 when Ostrava-Karviná's workers joined hundreds of thousands of their fellow 
laborers across Cisleithania in a general strike against the war.160 
The dynamic in play was a microcosm of the progressive estrangement between 
156.  Huemos, "'Kartoffeln her,” 273.
157.  Ibid., 262. Deadly force was used 21 times between 1915 and 1916, 78 times in 1917, and 93 times in 
1918 before the final collapse.
158.  ÖstA/KA Zst KM 1917, Abt. 10. Carton 38, Nr. 41/7(634). "Kundgebung." May 17th, 1917.
159.  Die Regelung der Arbeitsverhältnisse, 203-204.
160.  Rudolf Neck, "Die österreichische Arbeiterbewegung vom Jänner bis November 1918," in Die 
Auflösung des Habsburgerreiches: Zusammenbruch und Neuorientierung im Donauraum, ed. Richard G. 
Plaschka and Karlheinz Mack (Munich: Verlag R. Oldenbourg, 1970) 74.
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the Habsburg state and the peoples over which it ruled. Their concerns dismissed, their 
suffering ignored, more and more sacrifice for the war effort was required as less and less 
was provided to compensate them for their exertions. The draconian military regime in 
the coal district forced the workers there to choose between treason and starvation. The 
population of the Ostrava-Karviná district was called upon to provide more and given 
less than many areas of the Monarchy, and thus the breakdown of the original system of 
war mobilization occurred earlier there than almost anywhere else. Though an extreme 
case, the district can also be seen as exemplifying the process which was to expand 
throughout the Monarchy and finally even into the Habsburg military. The tension 
between unbearable wartime conditions and untenable military demands fueled by 
grandiose conceptions of military necessity, in the district as in the Monarchy, drove the 
population to act against the state.
Further, the idea that the application of military coercion could overcome all 
obstacles prevented the emergence of a partnership between the Habsburg state and its 
laboring population. The rejection of this possibility even before the First World War 
began and the substitution of militarized and authoritarian measures destroyed the 
possibility of a secondary mobilization behind the war effort at the very moment in which 
it was most drastically necessary. The mining population's alienation from the state as 
well as from the war effort also challenged the legitimacy of the state's power to direct 
and mobilize its citizenry. It destabilized war industries and tied up increasing numbers of 
troops for internal pacification.161 
The Ostrava-Karviná district was one of the most important underpinnings of war 
production in the Habsburg Monarchy, and its labor force was critical to Habsburg 
161.  Huemos, "'Kartoffeln her," 286.
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economic mobilization. The framework of military labor discipline set in place there at 
the beginning of the First World War functioned as long as the state was able to provide a 
sufficient basis for the material existence of the work force, but by 1916 this system was 
bankrupt. The threat of violence carried out under a system of administrative coercion 
was no longer sufficient to maintain coal output, and the only available means of ensuring 
its continuance was the exercise of violence against the mining population. The 
government debates over the proper response to the breakdown of the system of 
militarized labor discipline demonstrated this well. Though proper provisioning would 
have been optimal, it was also impossible. Patchwork attempts to repair the system of 
administrative coercion foundered on the difficulty of meaningfully sharpening the threat 
of violence implicit in the system. Ultimately, though, only recourse to increasing 
exertions of violence maintained productivity after the breakdown of militarized labor 
discipline in 1916. Militarized labor discipline thus failed to provide a firm basis for the 
continuing mobilization of mine labor in the Ostrava-Karviná district.
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APPENDIX ONE: GERMAN TERMS AND TRANSLATIONS
Ministry of Public Works Ministerium für Öffentliche Arbeit
Anthracite Steinkohle
Lignite Braunkohle
Minister of the Interior Innenminister
Ministry of the Interior Ministerium des Innern
Zone of Army Operations Bereich der Armee im Felde
War Ministry Kriegsministerium
Army High Command Armeeoberkommando
War Production Law Kriegsleistungsgesetz
County Presidium Landespräsidium
Extraordinary Security Force Assistenz
Militia Law Landsturmgesetz
Militia laborer Landsturmarbeiter
Worker Co-operatives Konsumvereine
War Provisions Transfer Agency Kriegsgetreideverkehrsanstalt
Directoral Conference Direktorenkonferenz
Pushcart Operators Hundstößer
Signalman Anschläger
Billeted Kaserniert
District Captain Bezirkshauptmann
State Police Bureau Staatspolizeiliches Bureau
Coal Cadre Commandant Kohlenkaderkommandant
War Bonus Kriegszulage
Lodging and Upkeep Kost und Quartier
Ministry for Home Defence Ministerium für Landesverteidigung
Governor Statthalter
District Administration Bezirkshauptmannschaft
Uprising Aufruhr
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